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National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley:
First Amendment Free Speech No Longer
Guaranteed for the Arts
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,1 the United States
Supreme Court confronted the decency and respect criteria of the 1990
Amendment ("Amendment") to the National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities Act of 1965.2 At issue was whether the Amendment
violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution by impermissibly discriminating based on viewpoint and being void
for vagueness.3 The Supreme Court upheld the Amendment as facially
valid.4
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Congress created the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") in
1965 as part of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities.5
Since its inception, the NEA has awarded over three billion dollars in
grants with very few formal complaints "about misapplied funds or
abuse of the public's trust."6 The Amendment at issue, passed in 1990,
is the result of congressional outrage over two works funded by the NEA:
an exhibit by Robert Mapplethorpe including "homoerotic photographs"
and a piece by Andres Serrano depicting the "crucifix immersed in
urine."7 The Amendment directs the NEA to consider "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public" in awarding grants.' In response to the Amendment,
the NEA adopted a resolution to ensure diverse membership of panels
conducting the initial review of grant applications.9

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
20 U.S.C. § 953 et seq. (1994).
Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
Id. at 2179.
Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2172.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2173.
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Prior to the Amendment's enactment, plaintiffs, individual performance artists, sought funding by the NEA.' ° Although initially
approved by a panel, their applications were subsequently denied by the
National Council on the Arts.
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint
alleging violations of their First Amendment rights, 2 as well as
violations of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act' 3
and of the Privacy Act.' 4 After the 1990 Amendment was enacted,
plaintiffs amended their complaints. 5 Joined by the National Association of Artists' Organization, plaintiffs claimed that the Amendment
violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights of free speech and due
process, respectively. 6
Stating that the complaint indicated that
plaintiffs' applications were denied based on the content of plaintiffs'
past performances, the district court denied the NEA's motions for
judgment on the pleadings 7 and for summary judgment on the
constitutional violations of the Amendment. 8 The court stated that the
Amendment violated the Fifth Amendment due process requirement
because it "fail[edl adequately to notify applicants of what is required of
them or to circumscribe NEA discretion." 9 Likewise, it violated the
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech by "sweep[ing] within its
ambit [protected] speech" and expression.2"
Dismissing the NEA's contention that the decency and respect criteria
were not vague because the NEA was not required to add them to its
standards for judging grant applications 2' and because its requiring
diverse panels ensured adherence to the criteria,22 the court of appeals
affirmed the district court. The court held that the NEA's interpretation

10. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1462-63.
11. Id.
12. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that their applications were denied for political reasons and
that the NEA failed to follow First Amendment procedural safeguards. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552A (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1464.
18. Id. at 1476.
19. Id. at 1472.
20. Id. at 1476.
21. Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1996). The NEA interpreted the
Amendment's language of "taking into consideration" as authorizing, not mandating,
consideration of the criteria. Id. at 676.
22. Id. The NEA contended that the diverse panels, "reflect[ing] a wide range. of
backgrounds and points of view," would necessarily reflect general standards of decency
and respect for the various views and beliefs of the American public. Id.
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was implausible based on the language of the statute, 3 its legislative
history,24 and canons of statutory construction. 25 Likewise, the court
rejected the NEA's assertion that the criteria did not violate free speech26
because "the government may restrict the content of speech it funds"
and held that the criteria constituted viewpoint discrimination and that
the government could not discriminate based on viewpoint even when it
funds speech.2
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kleinfeld distinguished between the
government's awarding a prize and its giving an entitlement.2 8 In the
former instance, the government "necessarily" discriminates by content
and viewpoint. 29 Thus, because an NEA grant is like a prize to its
recipient, s° the government can discriminate based on viewpoint or
content.3
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decency and
respect criteria on the ground that they were neither unconstitutionally
discriminatory based on viewpoint nor unconstitutionally vague.32
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A fundamental principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is that the
government may not preclude speech "simply because society finds the
[speech] ... offensive or disagreeable." 3' The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that the regulation of speech based on content or
viewpoint is subject to strict scrutiny,34 which renders the regulations
unconstitutional in most cases. Although Congress has the power to
regulate speech "on the basis of a noncontent element" like noise, and
even on a content element like obscenity, it does not have the power to
"proscribe [speech] on the basis of other content elements."3" Furthermore, content-based discrimination may be constitutional if the class of

23. Id. at 676. The statute reads that "the Chairperson shall ensure that.. . ." Id.
(emphasis added).
24. Id. at 677. The amendment was a response to NEA funding for two controversial
works of art, evidencing congressional intent that the criteria should apply. Id.
25. Id. at 676. NEA's reading renders section 959(c), which requires diverse panels,
superfluous. Id.
26. Id. at 681.
27. Id. at 682.
28. Id. at 684 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 687.
30. Id. at 685.
31. Id. at 687.
32. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179.
33. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
34. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984); Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
35. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
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speech being discriminated against is a proscribable one and if the
discrimination is based solely on the "very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable."3 6 For example, the government may
prohibit only obscenity involving "the most lascivious displays of sexual
activity," but may not prohibit only obscenity containing "offensive
political messages."37
5
In R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,"
the Court struck a city ordinance that
criminalized the placing of a burning cross on public or private property
"which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender."39 Bound by the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation
of the ordinance,4" the Court nevertheless found that the statute
constituted viewpoint discrimination. 4' The Court stated that the
ordinance violated the First Amendment by allowing abusive expression
"no matter how vicious or severe"4 2 as long as the expression did not
contain references "to one of the specified disfavored topics."43 Stating
that "majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than
silencing speech on the basis of its content," the Court discounted the
City's assertion that the ordinance was the only way it could let
minorities
know that "group hatred" was "not condoned by the majori44
ty."1

Likewise, the Court rejected the City's argument that the ordinance
fell within the "secondary effects" exception to First Amendment
prohibitions of content-based discrimination found in Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.4" The City argued that the ordinance sought to protect
minorities from "victimization" due to their minority status.46 The
Court, however, stated that "[]isteners' reactions to speech are not the
type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton."4 ' The City further

36. Id. at 388.
37. Id.
38. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
39. Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
40. Id. at 381. The Minnesota court had held the phrase "arouses anger, alarm or
resentment" was limited to conduct amounting to "fighting words" within the meaning of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 505 U.S. at 380-81.
41. Id. at 391.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 392 (citing Brief for Respondents at 25, R.A.F. (No. 90-7675)).
45. Id. at 394 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)) (applying a "content-neutral" time,
place, and manner analysis to uphold a zoning ordinance restricting the placement of adult
theatres near schools, churches, and residential areas).
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
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contended that, even if the ordinance was content-based discriminatory,
it was nevertheless constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling state interest of protecting the rights of groups that
had been historically subject to discrimination. The Court held that
the ordinance was not necessary to fulfill the City's purported interest
because 49there were neutral alternatives that would satisfy that
interest.
Stating that the distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination is imprecise, the Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia5' rejected the University's argument that its
refusal to pay publication costs for a student journal with religious
overtones constituted content, not viewpoint, discrimination and, thus,
was not "presumptively unconstitutional."5 1 Instead, analogizing to
52
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the

Court found that the University's policy constituted viewpoint discrimination.5 3 The Court discounted the University's attempt to distinguish
between the funds it denied and the access to facilities denied in Lamb's
Chapel on the ground that "the State must have substantial discretion
in determining how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish its
educational mission."5 4 The Court noted a distinction between the
government as speaker and the government as facilitator.55 On one
hand, the government acts as speaker either by actually speaking or by
providing funds to private entities to relay the government's message,
both of which allow the government to "make content-based choices" and
to "say what it wishes."5" On the other hand, the government acts as
facilitator by "expend[ing] funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers," which does not allow the government to discriminate
based on viewpoint.57 Arguing that while "money is scarce[,] ...
physical facilities are not," 8 the University sought a further distinction
from Lamb's Chapel. The Court, however, rejected that argument on the

48. Id. at 395.
49. Id. One possible alternative given by the Court was an ordinance banning all
fighting words without limiting them to certain topics. Id. at 396.
50. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

51.

Id. at 830-31.

52. 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding unconstitutional a school district's denial of a church's
request to show on school property a video on family issues).
53. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31.
54. Id. at 832.

55. Id. at 833.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 834 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
58. Id. at 835.
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ground that scarcity requires the state to allocate resources on "some
acceptable neutral principle," but does not allow the state "to exercise
viewpoint discrimination that is otherwise impermissible."5 9 The Court
also noted two dangers to First Amendment principles that the
University's policy represented: (1) a danger to liberty by allowing the
state to read journals to ascertain their ideas and then to classify the
journals based on those ideas and (2) a danger to speech by "chilling...
individual thought and expression."60 In a final attempt to save its
policy, the University argued that it was prohibited by the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause to fund religious journals.6 1
Stating that the Establishment Clause does not require "the University
to deny eligibility to student publications because of their viewpoint,"6 2
the Court dismissed that argument with a wave of its proverbial hand.
The Supreme Court has attempted to draw a line between regulation
of indecent and obscene speech. Although the Court has stated that
obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment,63 it has not been as
precise with regard to indecent speech.
In FCC v. Pacifica,' the Court upheld an FCC order that declared
"indecent" a broadcast of an afternoon monologue by George Carlin
containing numerous references to excretory or sexual activities or
organs.65 The Court readily discounted Pacifica's definition of "indecent" as requiring a prurient appeal, stating that it was supported by
neither the language nor the history of 18 U.S.C. § 146466 or by
precedent. 67 The Court likewise dismissed Pacifica's argument that the
order unconstitutionally encompassed too much protected speech by
pointing out that the FCC had restricted its holding to the facts of the
case before it. 6" Pacifica next contended that nonobscene speech may
not be constitutionally prohibited from radio broadcast.6 9 The Court
noted that simply because "society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it"7" and that "[s]ome uses of even the

Id.
Id.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 845.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id. at 750-51.
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994) (provides for a fine, imprisonment, or both for anyone who
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication").
67. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741.
68. Id. at 742.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 745.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
"utters
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most offensive words are unquestionably protected."7 However, the
Court further stated that those type of words enjoy less protection in a
radio broadcast than they would in other contexts.72 Two reasons cited
by the Court for this lowered protection were the "uniquely pervasive
presence" of broadcast in the lives of Americans 73 and the unique
accessibility of broadcasting to children. 4 In closing, the Court noted
the narrowness of its holding, focusing on the content of the broadcast
and the time of day in which it aired. 5
Upholding the proscription of obscene interstate phone communications by the Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983,76
the Court in Sable Communications of California,Inc. v. FCC77 stated
the recurring principle that "the protection of the First Amendment does
not extend to obscene speech."7 s In holding unconstitutional the
statute's prohibition of indecent phone calls, the Court distinguished
Pacifica for the following reasons: Pacifica did not involve a complete
ban on indecent broadcasts, but sought to restrict those broadcasts "to
times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to
[them]"; 79 the court in Pacifica relied on the uniqueness of broadcasting
in its decision; 8° and the holding in Pacifica was restricted to the facts
of that case. s ' The Government asserted that anything less than a
complete ban on indecent phone communications would not protect
children from the messages contained in them.82 The Court dismissed
that assertion on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to show
that the Government could not use other, less restrictive means to meet
its compelling interest.8 3
The Court in Reno v. ACLUV4 held unconstitutional section 223(a)(1)(B) of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") of 1996,85 which

71. Id. at 746.
72. Id. at 748.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 749.
75. Id. at 750. The Court noted the time of day of the broadcast, the composition of the
audience, and the difference between radio and other media when narrowing its holding.

Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1)(A) (1994).
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 127 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 733).
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 128-29.
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997).
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criminalized the communication of indecent material via the Internet. 86
The Court distinguished the CDA from the statute at issue in Ginsberg
v. New York,87 which upheld a conviction for violation of a New York
statute prohibiting the sale to minors of materials that are obscene, on
the ground that the effects of the statute in Ginsberg were much
narrower than those of the CDA.88 Likewise, the Court distinguished
the CDA from the FCC's order in Pacifica on three grounds: the order
in Pacifica targeted a specific broadcast, 89 did not impose criminal
sanctions, 9° and dealt with a medium that had not received much First
Amendment protection.9 1 The Court also found a distinction between
the CDA and the zoning ordinance in Renton on the ground that the
ordinance in Renton dealt with the "secondary effects" of content. 92

Noting especial concern about the vagueness of the CDA because it
was a content-based criminal statute, the Court disregarded the
Government's assertion that the CDA was no more vague than the
obscenity standard promulgated by the Court in Miller v. California,93
which created a three-part test for obscenity in response to a conviction
under a California statute that made knowing distribution of obscene
material a misdemeanor. Furthermore, the Court held that the CDA
unreasonably burdened adult communication in an effort to protect
minors from indecent material.94 The Court also discussed the unprecedented breadth of the CDA's coverage of communication, which was not
limited to commercial speech or entities, and the Government's failure
to explain why a less restrictive prohibition would be ineffective.9" The
Government's attempts to limit the overbreadth of the CDA were quickly
dismissed by the Court.9" First, the Court found that the Government's
argument that the prohibited speech could be communicated on the
Worldwide Web because there were "ample 'alternative channels"' for
persons to engage in the restricted speech was irrelevant because a
"time, place, and manner analysis is ...inapplicable" when speech is

regulated based on content.9

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

7

Second, it reasoned that the Govern-

Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
Id. at 2342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2345 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
Id. at 2346.
Id. at 2347-48.
Id. at 2348.
Id.
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ment's argument that the statute's knowledge requirements limit the
statute's application was "untenable."8 Third, it found the Government's argument that "scientific, educational, or other redeeming
material" would escape the "indecent" and "patently offensive" prohibitions of the CDA lacked support.99 The Court severed the unconstitutional proscription on "indecent" transmissions, retaining the portion
prohibiting "obscene" transmissions."'
In addition to the distinction between indecent and obscene speech,
the Court has likewise tried to create a distinction between the
government as subsidizer and the government as regulator. When the
government subsidizes a program and chooses to exclude from its
subsidy certain ideas or viewpoints, it does not thereby discriminate
based on viewpoint.1 '
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,'0 ' 0a3
unanimous Court upheld Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3),'
which does not allow tax exemptions to organizations that engage in a
substantial amount of lobbying.0 4 The Court began its analysis by
noting that "tax exemptions and tax deductibility are forms of subsid[ies]."''
A nonprofit corporation that was denied tax-exempt status
under section 501(c)(3) argued that denying tax-exempt status to an
organization that exercised its constitutional right was unconstitutional
under Speiser v. Randall."°6 The corporation also argued that the
prohibition on lobbying by section 501(c)(3) organizations violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment because veterans'
organizations could receive tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(19)
0 7
and were allowed to engage in substantial lobbying activities.'
Addressing the first argument, the Court held that Congress had not
infringed on any First Amendment rights, but, rather, had simply

98. Id. at 2349.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2351.
101. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
102. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
103. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
104. Regan, 461 U.S. at 551.
105. Id. at 544. "A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the
organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible
contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's
contributions." Id.
106. Id. at 545 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (striking California's
requirement of a loyalty oath to receive an abatement of property tax for veterans)).
107. Id. at 546-47.
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refused to fund the exercise of those rights, which is constitutional. 08
With regard to the equal protection argument, the Court held that the
Code did not create "any suspect classification" and, thus, refused to
apply strict scrutiny to the statute. 10 9 The Court also stated that even
though the corporation might not have as much money as it would like
or as much as it would need to exercise its rights to the extent it wished,
the Constitution "'does not confer an entitlement to such funds
10 ° as may
be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.' 1
The Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California.' held
section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act 112 unconstitutional for
violating the First Amendment's protection of speech."' A nonprofit
corporation challenged section 399's ban on editorializing by noncommercial broadcasting stations receiving funding from the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting."' Noting the unique characteristics of broadcasting," ' the Court applied what some scholars might term "middle
scrutiny.""' The Court began its analysis by stating that section 399's
ban was "specifically directed at a form of speech-namely, the
expression of editorial opinion-that lies at the heart of First Amendment protection"" 7 and that the ban was content-based because "[a]8
wide variety of noneditorial speech... [was] plainly not prohibited.""
The Government argued that the ban was necessary to protect noncommercial broadcasting stations receiving federal funding from becoming
merely "vehicles for government propagandizing" and to protect them
from "private interest groups wishing to express their own partisan
viewpoints."" 9 Looking to legislative history to address the first

108. Id. at 545-46. "We again reject the 'notion that First Amendment rights are
somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.'" Id.
109. Id. at 548-49. "We have held in several contexts that a legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not
subject to strict scrutiny." Id.
110. Id. at 550 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)).
111. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
112. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
113. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 386.
114. Id. at 370-71 n.7.
115. Id. at 377 ("spectrum scarcity").
116. Id. at 380. The Court required the restriction to be "narrowly tailored to further
a substantial government interest." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 383.
119. Id. at 384-85. The Court readily dismissed the Government's second asserted
interest, finding that the ban did not substantially advance that interest because stations
could still broadcast their views by controlling the selection of programs and guests, and
finding that the interest was sufficiently protected by, for example, the FCC's fairness
doctrine. Id. at 396-99.
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purported interest, the Court noted congressional concern about
noncommercial broadcasting stations "becoming forums devoted solely
to programming and views that were acceptable to the Federal
Government."12 ° However, continuing to examine legislative history,
the Court doubted whether section 399 was intended to alleviate that
concern 12 1 and found that section 399 did not substantially advance
the Government's purported interest.'22 The Court also held that
section 399's ban was not "sufficiently tailored" to the Government's
interests "to justify its substantial interference with broadcaster's
speech."'2 3 Finding that the ban applied to many private stations as
well as to those stations receiving federal funding and noting that
legislative history illustrated congressional concern about influence from
the federal government, the Court dismissed the Government's argument
that the ban also helped to protect stations from influence by state or
local governments.'2 4
Furthermore, the Court found other, less
restrictive means to satisfy the Government's interest. 25 Finally, the
Court addressed the Government's analogy to Regan, 26 finding Regan
distinguishable on the ground that section 399 banned all editorializing
by stations receiving federal funding, whereas the tax in Regan allowed
an organization
"to segregate activities according to the source of its
" 127
funding.
In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,12s the Court found
unconstitutional the newspaper and magazine exemptions of the
Arkansas sales tax. 129 Readily dismissing the State's contention that

120. Id. at 386.
121. Id. at 387.
122. Id. at 388. The interest was met, instead, by the "elaborate structure established
by the Public Broadcasting Act," as well as by provisions in the Act prohibiting the
interference by government entities and employees in the operation of the stations and of
the Corporation. Id. at 388-89 (citing sections 396(c)-(g), 398(a)).
123. Id. at 392-93. "Section 399 includes within its grip a potentially infinite variety
of speech, most of which would not be related in any way to governmental affairs, political
candidacies, or elections." Id.
124. Id. at 393-94.
125. Id. at 395. Congress could require stations to air disclaimers stating that the
opinions given were not representative of the federal government's views. Id.
126. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). See text accompanying supra notes 35-43.
127. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400.
128. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
129. Id. at 234. Exemptions "include[d] 'gross receipts or gross proceeds derived from
the sale of newspapers . .. and religious, professional, trade and sports journals and/or
publications printed and published within [Arkansas] ... when sold through regular subscriptions.'" Id. at 224 (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1904(f) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 26-52-401(4) (1997)) and (j) (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-401(14)
(1997))).
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the appellant lacked standing, 3 ' the Court proceeded to address the
State's arguments supporting the tax scheme. The State first contended
that the tax was "a generally applicable economic regulation" because it
imposed a nominal tax on the receipts of sales of all tangible property.'
The Court, on the other hand, declared the tax discriminatory
because it allowed an exemption for certain types of magazines while
taxing others. 3 2 The Court found this selective taxation based on the
content of magazines "particularly repugnant to First Amendment
principles."' 33 The State then sought to justify the tax by propounding
several compelling state interests: a general state interest in raising
revenue, 3 4 an interest in encouraging "fledgling" publishers,'35 and
a need to "foster communication" in the state.'36 Taking the first
purported interest, the Court stated that an interest in raising revenue
was insufficient to support selective treatment of members of the
press. 31 With regard to encouraging "fledgling" publishers, the Court
found that the tax was not "narrowly tailored to achieve that end"
because it was "both overinclusive and underinclusive." 35 Finally, the
Court held that an interest to foster communication was not achieved by
the tax because it only fostered information about "religion, sports, and
professional and trade matters." 39
Upholding the Department of Health and Human Services' ("HHS")
regulations prohibiting the use of funds obtained under Title X of the
Public Health Service Act 4 ° for abortion-related activities, the Court
in Rust v. Sullivan' answered the petitioners' first argument by
holding that the Secretary of HHS had the authority to promulgate the
4 2
regulations and that his construction of the statute was permissible.
Petitioners, Title X grantees and doctors supervising the disbursement

130. Id. at 227.
131. Id. at 228-29. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (upholding a
generally applicable tax in the face of a First Amendment challenge).
132. Id. at 229. See supra note 126.
133. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229.
134. Id. at 231.
135. Id. at 232.
136. Id. (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. at 32; Ragland at 232 (No. 85-1370)).
137. Id.
138. Id. "[Elven the most lucrative and well-established religious, professional, trade,
and sports journals do not pay sales tax. By contrast, struggling general interest
magazines and struggling specialty magazines on subjects other than those specified in [the
statute] are ineligible for favorable tax treatment." Id.
139. Id.
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (1994).
141. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
142. Id. at 184.
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of Title X funds on their own and their patients' behalf, also asserted
that the regulations were impermissibly viewpoint discriminatory
because they prohibited recipients of Title X funds from discussing
"abortion as a lawful option." 143 Applying Maher v. Roe, " the Court
stated that the government was simply exercising its authority to
"subsidize family planning services" and declining to "'promote or
encourage abortion.'' 145 The Court noted that the government has the
authority to limit the scope of its programs and that the regulations
were designed to enforce those limits. 46 Distinguishing Rust from
Arkansas Writers' Project, the Court stated that Rust related to the
government's refusal to fund activities outside the scope of its program
and was not an attempt to "singl[e] out a disfavored group on the basis
of speech content." 47 Likewise, noting that the government did not
deny a benefit, but only ensured that funds were spent for the purpose
for which they were earmarked, the Court rejected petitioners' argument
that the regulations' restrictions on subsidizing abortion-related speech
constituted a condition on a benefit by requiring the relinquishment of
a constitutional right. 148
Finally, the Court found that a Title X
grantee was not prohibited from discussing abortion-related issues, but
was only required to do so separately from activities receiving federal
149
funding.
III.

THE COURT'S RATIONALE

In Finley, the Court held constitutional the decency and respect
criteria contained in the 1990 Amendment to the National Foundation
on the Arts and Humanities Act ("Act") of 1965. s ° The Court deter-

143. Id. at 192.
144. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding constitutional Connecticut's policy of funding
childbirth but not nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women).
145. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94. "To hold that the Government unconstitutionally
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals
necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government programs
constitutionally suspect." Id. at 194.
146. Id. at 193-94. "[When the Government appropriates public funds to establish a
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program." Id. at 194.
147. Id. at 194.
148. Id. at 196. "The condition that federal funds will be used only to further the
purposes of a grant does not violate constitutional rights." Id. at 198.
149. Id. at 198.
150. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2172.
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mined that the Amendment was facially valid because it was neither
viewpoint discriminatory nor void for vagueness. 151
After setting forth the heavy burden that respondents (plaintiffs
below) had to carry in order to have the Amendment declared facially
unconstitutional,'5 2 the Court began its analysis by answering respondents' contention that the criteria required the NEA to deny funding
based on viewpoint discrimination.' 53 The Court held that the criteria
did not constitute viewpoint discrimination.1 4 First, the criteria were
155
merely advisory, as evidenced by the plain language of the statute,
its legislative history,' and the aim of the Amendment.'57 Second,
the Court distinguished R.A.V on the grounds that it related to a
statute carrying criminal penalties and that the statute had the effect
of suppressing views on disfavored topics; whereas, the Amendment at
issue did not silence speech because it did not pose an express threat of
censorship.15 8 The Court also noted that because the criteria were
subjective and, thus, susceptible to a myriad of interpretations, they did
not represent viewpoint discrimination."' Citing permissible applications of the criteria 6 ' and noting that these applications "would not
alone be sufficient to sustain the statute against ... First Amendment
challenge[s]," the Court nevertheless refused to find viewpoint discrimination because of the limited resources of the NEA, which require it to
be highly selective. 6'
Applying Rosenberger, the Court stated that although the two cases
were similar in that they both related to scarce resources, the similarity
ended there.'62 Unlike the University's policy of paying publication
costs for all journals except those manifesting a religious viewpoint, the
NEA's grant process is competitive and "does not indiscriminately

151. Id. at 2179-80.
152. Id. at 2175. "To prevail, respondents must demonstrate a substantial risk that
application of the provision will lead to the suppression of speech." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2176.
155. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) ("taking into consideration").
156. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176. The Amendment was a result of a bi-partisan counter
to proposed amendments that would have eviscerated the NEA or its grant-making
authority. Id.
157. Id. The Court stated that the Amendment's aim was to reform selection
procedures and not to preclude speech. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2176-77.
160. Id. at 2177. For example, the decency criterion is often used in educational
programs. Id.
161. Id. at 2177-78.
162. Id. at 2178.
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'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.'"'6 3 Additionally, the Act's "artistic excellence" criterion, which is "inherently content
based," differs from the University's criterion that the journals be
"'related to the educational purpose of the University.'"'"
After stating that it was not confronted with an "as-applied" constitutional challenge and that the case would have been different if the
criteria were used to suppress a disfavored view,'65 the Court next
distinguished between the government's using "impermissible" criteria
in regulating speech and in subsidizing speech.'66 Citing Regan, the
Court stated that Congress has "wide latitude to set spending priorities."'6 7 In an analogy to Rust, the Court held that Congress had
simply chosen to fund one program but was not required to fund an
alternative one and that Congress's choice did not constitute viewpoint
discrimination."
Finally, the Court addressed whether the Amendment was void for
vagueness.'6 9 Conceding that the terms of the criteria were vague and
might not be acceptable in "a criminal statute or regulatory scheme," the
Court declared that the criteria were not unconstitutionally vague in the
Amendment. 7 ° The Court noted that although the vagueness of the
terms may cause artists to "conform their speech" to that which may be
more acceptable to the NEA in order to acquire funding, Congress is not
constitutionally required to be precise when it acts "as patron rather
than as sovereign. ""' Furthermore, the Court held that if the Amendment were declared vague and struck for being unconstitutionally so,
then all other government programs subsidizing scholarships and grants
and employing similar criteria would be unconstitutional as well.' 72
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, first
stated that the majority ignored the plain language of the statute when
it agreed with the NEA that the Amendment is simply advisory.' 3
The Amendment reads that "the Chairperson 'shall ensure"' that the
criteria are taken into consideration in the award of grants; thus, the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834).
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824).
at 2178.
at 2179.

at
at
at
at

2179-80.
2179.
2179-80.
2180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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criteria must always be considered. 7 4 Scalia further wrote that the
Amendment is constitutional because it does not abridge speech; rather,
it only inhibits the funding of certain types of speech.' 75 Like the
majority, Scalia also noted that nearly all congressional funding
legislation is discriminatory but is still constitutional. 7 6 However,
unlike the majority, he stated that neither the First Amendment nor the
void for vagueness doctrine applies to the government's funding of
speech. 171
Justice Souter dissented, stating that the decency and respect criteria
mandate viewpoint-based discrimination, which is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment, by requiring "conformity with mainstream
mores," thereby excluding the expression of mores outside the mainstream.' v He also stated that the NEA's interpretation of the statute,
allowing compliance with the statute by having diverse values and
backgrounds represented by the membership of the advisory panels, was
incorrect. 7 9 The plain language of the statute and legislative history
supported the reading that the "decency and respect" criteria were not
an optional consideration but a mandatory one, and having diverse
panels did not fulfill that mandate. 80 Additionally, the NEA's reading
would have rendered superfluous section 959(c), which requires diverse
panels.' 8 ' Justice Souter also noted that the majority's statement that
the Amendment does not preclude awarding funds to applicants who did
not meet the criteria was inaccurate because this type of occurrence had
been the catalyst for the Amendment.'8 2 He determined that the First
Amendment applies the same even when the government is acting as a
patron of the arts so that Congress may still not promote one viewpoint
at the expense of another. 3 Justice Souter stated that the overbreadth doctrine, which strikes a statute if even one of its applications
is impermissible, should be applied because the criteria have the effect
of "'chill[ing] ... individual thought and expression. '"" 4 Fear of denial
of an application will cause some artists to alter their work in order to

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

2180-81.
2182.
2183.
2184.
2187 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2188.
2188-89.
2189.
2191.
2195 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835).
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meet the
criteria or will cause them to forego seeking funding from the
s5
NEA

IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The NEA plays a prominent role in the art world. Before its funding
was recently reduced, the NEA had granted sixty percent of the
applications it had received."' s Even after the recent cutbacks, the
NEA is still "the largest single source of national leadership and support
for the arts in America. ".. 7 Additionally, NEA funding acts as a
"major catalyst" for private funding of the arts. s'
As a result, the NEA's denial of funding has significant ramifications.
For the art world, receiving NEA funding is the equivalent of receiving
the Nobel Peace Prize,18 9 and when an applicant is denied funding by
the NEA, that artist's ability to receive private funding is significantly
reduced. 9 ° Because private funding groups tend to be rather conservative,1 91 art that is deemed "indecent" or "disrespectful" and is denied
NEA funding because it challenges traditionally-held ideas or viewpoints
is much less likely to receive private funds.
Because the NEA looks at all of an artist's work, including prior work,
in deciding whether to award funding, artists will be forced to conform
work produced with private funds to that which the NEA is more likely
to deem decent and respectful.192 Thus, the criteria not only have the
effect of chilling creative expression that might shake the status quo, but
also "invite mediocrity, blandness, and homogenization."1 93 That fact
is compounded by the amount of influence the NEA possesses in the art

185. Id. at 2195.
186. Brief for Respondents at 3, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371).
187. Brief of Twenty-Six Arts, Broadcast, Library, Museum and Publishing Amici
Curiae in Favor of Respondents at 15, Finley (No. 97-371).
188. Brief for Respondents at 9, Finley (No. 97-371). In 1993, NEA grants of
approximately "$120 million generated matching funds estimated at $1.1 billion." Id.
189. Brief Amicus curiae for the Rockefeller Foundation in Support of Respondents at
6, Finley (No. 97-371). "NEA awards confer an imprimatur of quality on an artist or
organization, significantly improving the grantee's chances of securing outside funding in
the future." Id.
190. Brief for Respondents at 9, Finley (No. 97-371).
191. Brief Amicus Curiae of Volunteer Lawyers of the Arts and Various Arts
Organizations in Support of Respondents at 18 n.9, Finley (No. 97-371).

192.

Brief for Respondents at 48, Finley (No. 97-371). "Any artist, curator, theater

producer, or publisher who thinks she might apply for an NEA grant in the future will be
chilled in the art that she creates today, for fear that an NEA official's judgment that it is
'indecent' or 'disrespectful' will count against her later." Id.
193. Brief Amicus Curiae of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts and Various Arts
Organizations in Support of Respondents at 20, Finley (No. 97-371).
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world. 9 4 Unfortunately, artists will have difficulty trying to satisfy
the criteria given the disparity of views on what actually constitutes
decency and respect. 9 '
Furthermore, the criteria upheld in Finley seem to cut against the
NEA's statutory purpose, which is "to foster private artistic expression
by creating 'a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination and
the material conditions facilitating the release of this
inquiry [and] also
' 196
creative talent.
ANDREA K. McKoY

194. See supra note 185.
195. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176-77.
196. Brief of Twenty-Six Arts, Broadcast, Library, Museum and Publishing Amici
Curiae in Favor of Respondents at 11, Finley (No. 97-371) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1994)).

